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NOTES
STARE DECISIS, CHEVRON, AND SKIDMORE:
DO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES HAVE THE POWER TO
OVERRULE COURTS?
[Blecause there is no Judge Subordinate, nor Soveraign, but
may erre in a Judgement of Equity; if afterward in another like
case he find it more consonant to Equity to give a contrary
Sentence, he is obliged to doe it. No mans error becomes his own
Law; nor obliges him to persist in it. Neither (for the same
reason) becomes it Law to other Judges, though sworn to follow
it.
- Thomas Hobbes
Stare decisis provides some moorings so that men may trade and
arrange their affairs with confidence.
-Justice William 0. Douglas2
INTRODUCTION
Contrary to the hopes of Thomas Hobbes, expressed in the above
quote from his landmark work Leviathan, stare decisis has fulfilled
the role sketched by Justice Douglas and remained a bulwark of
the Anglo-American legal system for centuries. In the latter half
of the twentieth century, a new area of law has begun to take form
alongside the time-tested pillars of our legal system, arising to deal
with the development of the modern administrative state. The
1. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 192 (Richard Tuck, ed., rev. student ed., 199).
2. William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. Rzv. 735, 736 (1949).
3. Stare decisis is "(tihe doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court
to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation." BLACICS
LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
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Supreme Court has responded by creating a muddled and
byzantine administrative law jurisprudence that leaves many
seminal questions unanswered. One of the foremost of these
questions is how the venerable doctrine of stare decisis interacts
with the practice of giving deference to administrative agency inter-
pretations of the statutes Congress charges them to administer.
The uncertainty in this area of the law is strikingly illustrated by
two quotes. The first is by one of the leading lights of the current
Supreme Court and a renowned expert on administrative law,
Justice Antonin Scalia. Dissenting in a recent case, Justice Scalia
asserted:
I know of no case, in the entire history of the federal courts, in
which we have allowed a judicial interpretation of a statute to
be set aside by an agency-or have allowed a lower court to
render an interpretation of a statute subject to correction by an
agency.4
In stark contrast is the holding of the Eleventh Circuit in Satellite
Broadcasting & Communications Ass'n of America v. Oman.'
Confronted with regulations promulgated by the Copyright Office
that directly conflicted with prior circuit precedent, a three judge
panel unanimously concluded:
Although the new regulations conflict with our interpretation
of the term "cable system" in [NBC v. Satellite Broadcasting
Networks], they are neither arbitrary, capricious, nor in conflict
with the clear meaning of the statute. They are therefore valid
exercises of the Copyright Office's statutory authority to
interpret the provisions of the compulsory licensing scheme, and
are binding on this circuit.6
This Note examines Supreme Court decisions addressing stare
decisis and administrative agencies, the statutes governing such
agencies, and the policy considerations underlying the actions
of both the Court and Congress in order to analyze whether
4. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 248-49 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
5. 17 F.3d 344 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 581 U.S. 823 (1994).
6. Id. at 345.
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administrative agencies are able to "overrule" courts in limited
settings. More specifically, this Note will consider the effect of post-
Chevron precedents created by application of the recently re-
utilized doctrine of "Skidmore deference" in administrative law.
This analysis leads directly to the conclusion that the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in Satellite Broadcasting properly recognized the
existence of an ability, albeit sharply limited, of administrative
agencies to "overrule" judicial precedent, which is particularly
applicable in the case of precedents granting deference under
Skidmore. Specifically, it will be argued that the "overruling"
procedure recognized by both the Eleventh Circuit and Justice
Scalia (in a hypothetical in his Mead dissent) does not pose a
significant threat to the values served by stare decisis and that any
negative effect in this area is far outweighed by the benefits such a
procedure will confer in terms of flexibility in administrative law.
Part I will provide the background information necessary to fully
explore the interaction of the doctrine of stare decisis and the law
governing administrative agencies. Particularly, Section 1A will
examine the process of administrative rulemaking by analyzing the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act that define and
govern agency rulemaking and judicial review of that process. More
specifically, this section will set out the statutory definition of
rulemaking, and examine Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,7 a recent
case that has had a significant impact on rulemaking. This section
will also summarize the academic debates surrounding these
definitions and their application. Section 1B will present an
overview of the doctrine of stare decisis including judicial and
academic perspectives.
Part II will focus on the development of administrative law
jurisprudence since the Court's landmark decision in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.' First,
Section IIA will examine Chevron itself and take note of the
academic debates that surrounded (and continue to surround) the
framework for deference that the Chevron Court established.
Second, Section IIIB will examine Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v.
7. 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
8. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Primary Steel, Inc.,9 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,"° and Neal v. United
States," in which the Supreme Court made often-cited statements
about the interaction of stare decisis and the Chevron doctrine. In
broad terms, the Court in these cases held that stare decisis trumps
the Chevron doctrine of deference to agency interpretations of
statutes. Third, Section IIC will examine the recent line of cases
that have revived the pre-Administrative Procedure Act doctrine of
"Skidmore deference " " as an intermediate level of deference
between Chevron deference and no deference at all. The case in
which Skidmore deference made its modern debut in the High
Court was Christensen v. Harris County. " Just last term, the Court
again applied Skidmore in United States v. Mead Corp." over the
aforementioned lone dissent of Justice Scalia.
Part III will present an in-depth analysis of both the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Satellite Broadcasting and similar cases, and
of Justice Scalia's dissent in Mead. Section IIIA will analyze
Justice Scalia's Mead hypothetical about administrative agencies
overruling courts and his arguments against letting such agencies
"overrule" courts. Section IIIB will examine the arguments for
allowing agencies to "overrule" precedent presented by the Eleventh
Circuit and other courts.
Part IV will conclude, first, that the administrative law juris-
prudence of the Supreme Court does not prohibit the procedure
utilized by the Eleventh Circuit and described in Justice Scalia's
hypothetical because Maislin, Lechmere, and Neal (on which Scalia
relied in his Mead dissent) can be properly characterized as dealing
solely with the conflict between agency action and stare decisis in
the context of pre-Chevron precedents. Second, the Note will
conclude that Justice Scalia's ossification argument in his dissent
in Mead is only problematic when a court is confronted with a very
limited set of circumstances. The public policy perspective values
deference to decision making by those most qualified, and this
policy underlies the modern administrative state. This policy
9. 497 U.S. 116 (1990).
10. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
11. 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
12. This doctrine stems from the 1944 case, Skidmore u. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
13. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
14. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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militates against mechanically applying a strict and wooden version
of stare decisis in administrative law. Finally, this Note will
analyze the conflict between this policy and the traditional Marbury
v. Madison15 argument that courts have the final say on the proper
interpretation of the laws and conclude that Marbury is of limited
impact.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Administrative Procedure Act
In 1946, Congress produced one of its landmark pieces of
legislation when it passed the original Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).1" It was evident to Congress in the years following the
initial massive expansion of the federal administrative state under
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal that a new
framework for overseeing and regulating administrative agencies
was needed. By passing the APA, Congress hoped to "set [ a pattern
designed to achieve relative uniformity in the administrative
machinery of the Federal Government."17 A further goal was to
"effectuate[] needed reforms in the administrative process and at
the same time preserve[] the effectiveness of the laws which are
enforced by the administrative agencies of the Government." For
the past fifty-five years, the growing number of administrative
agencies have labored to implement and fulfill the goals of the APA.
15. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
16. The APA was originally enacted June 11, 1946 by Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, §§1-12,
60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
17. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 5 (1947) (hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL].
18. Id. The Attorney General's manual more specifically identifies the basic goals of the
APA as follows:
The Administrative Procedure Act may be said to have four basic purposes:
1. To require agencies to keep the public currently informed of their
organization, procedures and rules ....
2. To provide for public participation in the rule making process ....
3. To prescribe uniform standards for the conduct of formal rule making
and adjudicatory proceedings, i.e., proceedings which are required by
statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing.
4. To restate the law of judicial review.
Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
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Agencies have largely done so using the rulemaking structures set
out in the APA.
It is important to thoroughly understand the APA-mandated
administrative rulemaking processes before moving on because
these procedures provide the framework for analyzing most agency
actions. First, the APA, in § 551(4), defines a rule as "the whole or
a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency .... " Proposed actions by administrative
agencies that fall within this definition must be promulgated
according to § 553, which sets out specific rulemaking procedures.
Section 553 divides agency action within the § 551(4) definition
of "rule" into three categories.'e The first category includes
"interpretive rules, general statements of policy, ... [and] rules of
agency organization, procedure or practice ..." which are exempted
from the rulemaking procedures set out in the rest of § 553.21 The
second and third categories are comprised of the wide range of
agency action that may be termed "legislative rules."22 Section 553
divides this broad category into two types of rules, informal and
formal, distinguished by the type of procedures agencies must
follow to create them. To informally promulgate a rule, the agency
must "follow [ a three-step procedure: (1) issuance of public notice
of the proposed rule, (2) receipt and consideration of comments from
all interested persons, and (3) issuance of the rule, incorporating a
19. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000).
20. It should be noted that some commentators divide rulemaking under the APA into
more than three categories. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1463, 1466-68 (1992). Professor Strauss sets out "four different species of activity that
can produce an outcome that fits the definition of 'rule' given in section 551(4) .. ' Id. at
1466. His taxonomy includes "formal rulemaking," "informal rulemaking," "Publication
rulemaking," and a catch-all category that includes "the body of materials that fit the APA
definition of 'rule' ... but that meet none of the procedural specifications of the preceding
three classes." Id. at 1466-68.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 553(bX3XA) (2000).
22. Legislative rules are often referred to as "substantive rules" as well. See, e.g.,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 17, at 30 n.3 (defining the term "substantive rule"
and juxtaposing this concept with "interpretive rule"); see also William Funk, When is a
"Rule' a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative
Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659 (2002) (examining how courts determine what is a legislative
rule).
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statement of its basis and purpose."28 This procedure, commonly
referred to as "notice and comment rulemaking," is the primary
means of promulgating administrative rules utilized today.24 As
such, this procedure is also the primary focus of this Note. It is,
however, important to understand the entire rulemaking scheme
set out in the APA.
Formal rulemaking differs from informal rulemaking in the
imposition of a further step between the public notice and issuance
steps of the notice and comment procedure. This step requires
that the agency conduct a formal, on the record hearing before
issuing the final rule.2" Davis and Pierce note: "Formal rulemaking
has become increasingly rare. With a few exceptions, agencies
[need only] use the informal rulemaking procedure to issue
rules that have binding, substantive effect.' 2 The "increasingly
rare"" instances when agencies use formal rulemaking occur when
Congress mandates compliance with the procedure in the agency's
organic statute.28
Despite the relative procedural ease with which rules are
promulgated through informal rulemaking, some commentators in
the academy have observed that, over time, a system has evolved
around these simple procedural requirements that has led to
23. 1 KENNETH CuLr DAvis & RICHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
7.1, at 287 (3d ed. 1994).
24. See id. at 288.
25. Id. The APA specifically recognizes this procedure in § 553(c) stating: "When rules
are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,
sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
26. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 23, at 288.
27. Id.; see SEIMONOFADMINsTRATWLAWANDREGUATORYPRACTICE,AMEIuCANBAR
ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK4 (William F. Funk et al.,
eds., 3d ed. 2000) ("Because few statutes [require it], formal rulemaking is used infrequently.
However, numerous agency statutes (often called 'hybrid rulemaking' statutes) do require
some specific procedures beyond the basic notice-and-comment elements of informal
rulemaking."). This result was largely mandated by the Supreme Court's holding in United
States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), that, standing alone, the words
"after hearing" did not necessarily trigger the APA's formal rulemaking requirements. See
GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 215 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that "in the quarter-
century since FECR was decided, no statute that does not contain the magic words 'on the
record' has been found to require formal rulemaking").
28. An "organic statute" isfa] law that establishes an administrative agency or local
government." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1421.
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significant "ossification!' 9 of administrative law. 0 The response of
administrative agencies to this problem, as identified by a 1993
report by the Carnegie Commission, has been clear-and clearly
troubling. The Commission reported that "many agencies today
tend to skirt the informal rulemaking process, turning far more
frequently than in the past to methods for promulgating policies
that are even less formal."31
The D.C. Circuit32 recently addressed this very problem in
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA.33 The question in Appalachian
Power revolved around an EPA guidance document entitled
"Periodic Monitoring Guidance for Title V Operating Permit
Programs." Was the document simply an interpretive rule exempt
from the procedural requirements of § 553 and not subject to
judicial review, or did it represent an agency attempt to make a
legislative rule without conforming with the informal rulemaking
procedures mandated rby the APA? The plaintiffs in the case,
electric power companies and trade associations representing the
chemical and petroleum industries, argued that the guidance
document at issue was invalid because it imposed requirements on
states regarding their operating permit programs under the Clean
Air Act, making it a legislative rule promulgated without adherence
to § 553. In a strongly worded opinion, the D.C. Circuit agreed,
holding that the guidance document was a major substantive
29. In a recent article, Professor Mark Seidenfeld wrote: "The term 'ossification' refers
to the inefficiencies that plague regulatory programs because of analytic hurdles that
agencies must clear in order to adopt new rules." Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and
Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483,483 (1997).
30. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 'Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992) (examining the problem of ossification, including its causes and
some possible solutions).
31. CARNEGIE COMMISSION, RISK AND THE ENvIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY
DECISION MAKING 107 (1993).
32. The importance of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit cannot be overstated in the field of administrative law. Due to the fact that most
government agencies are headquartered in Washington, D.C., the D.C. Circuit has
jurisdiction over, and in fact adjudicates, almost all disputes involving the actions of
administrative agencies. As one distinguished scholar once noted regarding administrative
law: "As a practical matter, the D.C. Circuit is something of a resident manager, and the
Supreme Court an absentee landlord." Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D. C.
Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 371.
33. 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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addition to the prior rule and setting aside the guidance document
in its entirety.3 4 The Court expressed significant suspicion of, and
frustration with, what it perceived to be agency attempts to
circumvent the informal rulemaking procedures required by § 553
of the APA."5
Seeking to clarify the somewhat murky inquiry into what
actually constitutes a "legislative rule," the D.C. Circuit stated:
"'Interpretive rules' and 'policy statements' may be rules within the
meaning of the APA ... though neither type of 'rule' has to be
promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking." 6 The court
recognized, however, that "[oinly 'legislative rules' have the force
and effect of law."" The court then strictly defined a legislative rule
as "one the agency has duly promulgated in compliance with the
procedures laid down in the [organic] statute or the Administrative
Procedure Act." 8 The court also indicated its willingness to go
beyond the label an agency attaches to a certain interpretation in
determining whether agency action is a legislative or interpretive
rule, stating, "an agency may not escape the notice and comment
requirements ... by labeling a major substantive legal addition to a
rule a mere interpretation."9 This holding confirms that, although
the Supreme Court has held that courts may not impose procedural
requirements in excess of those set forth in § 553,40 those that are
34. Id. at 1028 ("In sum, we are convinced that elements of the Guidance ... significantly
broadened the 1992 rule. The more expansive reading of the rule, unveiled in the Guidance
cannot stand.").
35. The court stated:
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar .... Law is made, without notice
and comment, without public participation, and without publication in the
Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations.... An agency operating in
this way gains a large [efficiency] advantage.... The agency may also think there
is another advantage-immunizing its lawmaking from judicial review.
Id. at 1020 (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 1021.
37. Id. at 1020 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 & n.31 (1979)).
38. Id. The court continued its analysis in an accompanying footnote stating, "We have
also used 'legislative rule' to refer to rules the agency should have, but did not, promulgate
through notice and comment rulemaking." Id. at 1020 n. 11 (citing Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine
Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106,1110 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). For the purposes of this Note,
however, the term "legislative rule" only applies to agency rules promulgated through the
traditional notice and comment procedure.
39. Id. at 1024 (emphasis added).
40. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519,
545 (1978) (examining and rejecting the argument that § 553 "merely establishes lower
20021 413
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requirements in § 553 are vigorously policed by the courts. Informal
rulemaking is thus properly the main focus of this Note.
In addition to setting out the procedural requirements for
rulemaking, the APA also provides for judicial review of agency
actions. 1 APA § 704 provides that "[a] gency action made reviewable
by statute and final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review."42
Building on § 704, § 706 sets out the scope of judicial review of
agency action under the APA." These statutory provisions,
however, provide only the starting point for this Note's discussion
of judicial review of administrative agency action. Much more
important will be the discussion of the Supreme Court's law in this
area, particularly the doctrine of deference announced in Chevron."
B. The Basics of Stare Decisis
Another judge-made doctrine central to our legal system is stare
decisis. As Rafael Gely noted in a 1998 article, "Stare decisis is
procedural bounds and that a court may routinely require more than the minimum when an
agency's proposed rule addresses complex or technical factual issues or 'Issues of Great
Public Import') (citation omitted).
41. For an interesting argument against any judicial review of agency actions (even that
mandated by the APA), see Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review
ofRulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1999). Professor Cross argues that "[tihe case forjudicial
review of agency rulemaking is based on assumptions that do not withstand scrutiny." Id.
at 1333. In the end he concludes: "Defenders of judicial review should bear the burden of
proof of justification-proving that the intervention of courts can improve the process.
Experience suggests that this burden cannot be borne successfully." Id. at 1334.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
43. The statute specifically states that:
The reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall...
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be -
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law....
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
44. See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
414
STARE DECISIS, CHEVRON, AND SKIDMORE
probably the most basic principle ofjudicial decision-making in the
Unites [sic] States."'5 At the outset of this discussion, therefore, it
bears repeating that the term stare decisis refers to "Itihe doctrine
of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier
judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation."6
The second Justice Harlan penned a more artful explanation of the
doctrine and its foundational reasoning in a 1970 case:
Very weighty considerations underlie the principle that
courts should not lightly overrule past decisions. Among these
are the desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for the
conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with
assurance against untoward surprise; the importance of
furthering fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the
need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case; and
the necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a
source of impersonal and reasoned judgments. The reasons for
rejecting any established rule must always be weighed against
these factors. 7
The reasoning behind stare decisis is thus a key factor in
understanding the doctrine. The values Justice Harlan identified-
predictability, furthering equality and fairness, maintaining
institutional prestige, and preserving scarce judicial resources-
are frequently identified as the doctrinal underpinnings for stare
decisis.4'
45. Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating: A (Somewhat) New Look at Stare Decisis, 60
U. PITT. L. REV. 89, 104 (1998).
46. BLACKIS LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1414. It is important to note, however,
that "[sitare decisis is not an end in itself, but a means to serve important values in the legal
system." Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV.
43, 121 (2001).
47. Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
48. Although these are the commonly recognized core values underlying stare decisis,
some commentators have expanded on this list. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling
Chevron and Stare Decisia, 85 GEo. L.J. 2225, 2237 (1997) (listing the following six benefits
of stare decisis: "(1) conserving scarce institutional resources; (2) encouraging decisionmakers
to exercise foresight in announcing new rules; (3) protecting institutional reputation; (4)
reducing variations among decisionmakers; (5) enhancing intertemporal equity; and (6)
protecting reliance interests').
2002] 415
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In analyzing the basic framework of this doctrine, commentators
have recognized a "three-tiered hierarchy of stare decisis .
Professor Eskridge describes the structure as follows:
Common law precedents enjoy a strong presumption of
correctness. The Court applies a relaxed, or weaker, form of that
presumption when it reconsiders its constitutional precedents,
because the difficulty of amending the Constitution makes
the Court the only effective resort for changing obsolete
constitutional doctrine. Statutory precedents, on the other hand,
often enjoy a super-strong presumption of correctness."
The Supreme Court has recognized and applied this hierarchical
structure, particularly with regard to the distinction between
constitutional and statutory stare decisis. For example, in Payne v.
Tennessee,5 the Court held:
[Wihen governing decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned,
"this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent." Stare
decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it "is a principle
of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decision." This is particularly true in constitutional cases,
because in such cases "correction through legislative action is
practically impossible." 2
In stark contrast to the Court's pronouncement about constitutional
cases in Payne is the Court's discussion of stare decisis in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union.' The Court stated:
49. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362
(1988).
50. Id. In the balance of the article, Eskridge lays out a critique of the super-strong
presumption of correctness on behalf of statutory precedents and concludes:
The super-strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents has
never been thoroughly examined by the Court, and its rhetoric ought to be
abandoned. In its place, the Court ought to focus on traditional stare decisis
concerns--errors in the precedent's premises or reasoning, the practical
operation of the precedent, the fit between the precedent and current statutory
and constitutional policy, private and public reliance.
Id. at 1426.
51. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
52. Id. at 827-28 (citations omitted).
53. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
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We have said also that the burden borne by the party advocating
the abandonment of an established precedent is greater where
the Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory construction.
Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of
statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of
constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated,
and Congress remains free to alter what we have done."
On this rationale, if administrative agency action is analyzed solely
as statutory interpretation, stare decisis would seem to be a
formidable hurdle for agencies to overcome in implementing policy
where controlling judicial precedent exists because the possible
universe of agency policy choices would shrink with the
announcement of each new precedent. The interaction of stare
decisis and administrative law is thus of prime importance and the
focus of this Note.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ADMINISTRATIE LAW JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Watershed: Chevron
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court announced a
unanimous decision that forever changed the lay of the land in
administrative law. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,55 the Court set forth the analytical structure
all courts must apply when considering whether to defer to an
administrative agency's interpretation of the statute Congress
charged the agency with administering. In Chevron itself, the
question was whether the Court should defer to a properly
promulgated Environmental Protection Agency rule' interpreting
the ambiguous provisions of the amended Clean Air Act. The rule
defined a "source" of pollution in such a way that a whole industrial
plant could be considered a single source. As the Chevron Court
stated: "The question presented by these cases is whether EPA's
decision to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices
54. Id. at 172-73.
55. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
56. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981).
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within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased
within a single 'bubble' is based on a reasonable construction of the
statutory term 'stationary source.'"57
The Court took full advantage of the opportunity to clarify the
question of deference due to administrative agencies. In doing so,
it set out the now classic Chevron two-step analysis distinguishing
how courts should review agencies' statutory interpretations from
the courts' traditional approach to statutory interpretation absent
any agency interpretation. In the former situation, the Court
stated: "First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress."' The determination of whether Congressional intent
has been unequivocally expressed is thus the threshold question.
An affirmative answer eliminates a wide range of agency rules
promulgated pursuant to the clear intent of Congress from special
Chevron review. As the Court noted in a footnote following the
above quote: "If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the
precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be
given effect."59 The second analytical step put forth by the Court is
reached only when Congress has not clearly spoken to the issue at
hand.
The second Chevron step consists of a review of the agency action
to determine only whether it is a reasonable interpretation of the
ambiguous statutory provision. The Court expressed itself very
clearly on this issue:
57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
58. Iti at 842-43. As Professors Davis and Pierce note, the Chevron Court "created a new
two-step test to be applied to all attempts by agencies to give content to the statutes they
administer ... DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 23, § 3.2, at 109 (emphasis added). This
conceptualization of Chevron's locus in the judicial review process is buttressed by the fact
that the majority opinion in Chevron fails to cite or discuss APA § 706.
59. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added). Agency action in the face of clear
congressional intent must be reviewed pursuant to the default guidelines set forth in APA
§ 706 to determine whether the agency in question has implemented the clearly expressed
congressional intent. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial
review provisions of the APA).
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If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."
The Court further held: "The [reviewing] court need not conclude
that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could
have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the
court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a
judicial proceeding[;]"6 it need only defer to an agency's reasonable
interpretation. 2 The Chevron two-step analysis thus effectively
separated judicial statutory construction in the absence of
administrative action from review of administrative agency action
for deference.
It is important to briefly identify the values served by the
Chevron doctrine. Professor Richard J. Pierce, Jr. clearly set out
these values as follows:
The Chevron doctrine simultaneously furthers six goals: (1)
it allocates policymaking power in a manner consistent with the
need for political accountability; (2) it provides a method of
enforcing the nondelegation doctrine; (3) it defines the
constitutionally permissible place of agencies in government; (4)
it provides the Supreme Court a means to enhance its ability to
control the growing, decentralized, and ideologically diverse
judicial branch; (5) it provides a means to further the values of
due process and equal protection in the context of the
administrative state; and (6) it provides a means through which
agencies can construct consistent and coherent benefit and
regulatory programs.6
The importance of the values identified by Professor Pierce lies in
their usefulness as benchmarks in analyzing outcomes of judicial
60. Id. at 843 (footnote omitted).
61. Id. at 843 n.11 (citing cases).
62. Id. at 843-44.
63. Pierce, supra note 48, at 2229.
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review and for comparison with the values furthered by stare
decisis previously discussed."
While the importance of the Court's decision in Chevron was
immediately recognized both by courts and the legal academy,' the
last seventeen years have seen an explosion of both jurisprudence
and scholarly work on the Chevron doctrine."6 As stated above, the
focus of this Note is the interplay between the doctrine of stare
decisis and Chevron. As the Chevron Court had no occasion to
discuss stare decisis, the focus now shifts to the cases following
Chevron in which the Supreme Court considered how the Chevron
framework interacts with stare decisis.
B. The Supreme Court's Stare Decisis and Chevron Trio: Maislin,
Lechmere, and Neal
It became clear in the years following the Chevron decision in
1984 that the Supreme Court would at some point have to address
the interplay between its Chevron two-step analysis and the
venerable doctrine of stare decisis. The first case in which the
Supreme Court undertook this task was Maislin Industries,
U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc."' In Maislin, the Court confronted
a dispute concerning Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
rulemaking proceedings interpreting the Interstate Commerce Act
(ICA) to allow carriers to negotiate shipping rates lower than the
tariff rates on file with the ICC, effectively circumventing the
64. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
65. The importance of Chevron to the field of administrative law can be illustrated rather
dramatically by the number of times it has been cited in other cases. "Shepardizing" Chevron
on Lexis produces 1,070 citing decisions in the five year period between 1984 and 1989
immediately following the original Chevron decision. When the time frame is expanded to
the present, that number rises to 6,575 citing decisions. Academic commentators have also
recognized the importance of Chevron. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2075 (1990) ("Chevron promises to be a pillar in
administrative law for many years to come. It has become a kind of Marbury, or counter-
Marbury, for the administrative state.").
66. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
834 & nn.6-8 (2001) (identifying three major areas of academic commentary on the Chevron
doctrine and collecting a large sample of major articles in each area). Even a brief review of
this body of work is beyond the modest scope of this Note. For the reader interested in
delving deeper, the author highly recommends the above-cited article by Merrill and
Hickman as an introduction to, and a foundation for further study of the Chevron doctrine.
67. 497 U.S. 116 (1990).
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century old "filed rate doctrine."6 Addressing the interplay of stare
decisis and the Chevron doctrine in this case was almost inevitable
because of the ICA's advanced age and litigious history.69 Due to the
fact that the statute in question was a major piece of legislation
and over 100 vyears old at the time the Maislin case came before
the Court, there was much relevant Supreme Court precedent
interpreting the ICA. Indeed, the Maislin Court conducted a
thorough review of the venerable line of filed rate doctrine
precedent interpreting the rate-filing requirements of the ICA and
refused to grant Chevron deference to the ICC's Negotiated Rates
policy."° Regarding the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court noted the
respect that it "must accord to longstanding and well-entrenched
decisions, especially those interpreting statutes that underlie
complex regulatory regimes."7 ' The Court then emphatically stated:
"Once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to
that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge
an agency's later interpretation of the statute against our prior
determination of the statute's meaning. "72
This forceful statement by the Court in support of a strong
presumption of correctness of statutory precedents, even where the
agency's interpretation would be due Chevron deference if there
68. Although the Court in Maislin does not make this clear, it appears that the ICC
adopted the rule in question through the formal rulemaking procedure described above,
making it a formal rule. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. In Maislin, the ICC
had adopted, and subsequently clarified, a rule proposed by the National Industrial
Transportation League (NITL) regarding a relaxation of the strict rate reporting provisions
of the ICA. See NITL-Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier
Rates, 3 I.C.C.2d 99 (1986) (announcing the ICC's original decision to adopt the proposed rule
interpreting the ICA); NITL-Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common
Carrier Rates, 5 I.C.C.2d 623 (1989) (clarifying the policy announced in 1986 and providing
guidance on what the Commission considered unreasonable conduct within the scope of the
policy).
69. The ICA was first enacted in 1887. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104,24 Stat. 379
(Feb. 4, 1887).
70. Maislin, 497 U.S. at 126-31. The Court cited filed rate doctrine cases spanning the
twentieth century and noted in particular that the *classic statement of the Tiled rate
doctrine' was made in 1915. Id. at 127 (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell,
237 U.S. 94 (1915)). Following the review of a century's worth of precedent, the Court
concluded: 'For a century, this Court has held that the Act, as it incorporates the filed rate
doctrine, forbids as discriminatory the secret negotiation and collection of rates lower than
the filed rate." Id. at 130.
71. Id. at 131 (quoting California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 499 (1990)).
72. Id.
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were no precedent, has formed the basis for the Court's juris-
prudence on this issue for the last eleven years. In the next case
involving the interaction of stare decisis and the Chevron doctrine,
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB," Justice Thomas's majority opinion did not
significantly extend the rule laid down in Maislin. After noting that
"[b]efore we reach any issue of deference to the Board, however, we
must first determine whether [the NLRB order at issue] ... is
consistent with our past interpretation of § 7 [of the NLRAI," ' the
majority's analysis consisted simply of a direct quote of the holding
from Maislin.75 Lechmere thus does not represent a significant
extension or clarification of the interplay between stare decisis and
the Chevron doctrine.76
The final case in the Court's trio of decisions addressing stare
decisis in this context, Neal v. United States,77 does, in contrast to
Lechmere, represent a major clarification of the relationship
between Chevron and stare decisis. In Neal, the Court considered
whether to defer to the United States Sentencing Commission on
how to calculate the weight of LSD which conflicted with a prior
Supreme Court decision, Chapman v. United States.7 It is
important to note before discussing the very clear and unanimous
holding in Neal that the Court stated in this case that "the
Commission does not have the authority to amend the statute we
construed in Chapman."79 The Court also stated that "Congress
intended the Commission's rulemaking to respond to judicial
decisions in developing a coherent sentencing regime ...."80
After noting the Commission's limited rulemaking power, the
Court held that "[tihe Commission's dose-based method [for
73. 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (reviewing a decision ofthe NLRB construing the National Labor
Relations Act to allow union organizers to use the parking lot of a store to approach that
store's employees for the purpose of unionizing the store).
74. Id. at 536.
75. Id. at 536-37 (quoting Maislin, 497 U.S. at 131).
76. For an interesting argument largely based on public policy that Lechmere was
wrongly decided, see Susan K Goplen, Note, Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies'
Legal Interpretations After Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 68 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1993).
77. 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
78. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
79. Neal, 516 U.S. at 290.
80. Id. (citation omitted).
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determining the weight of LSD] cannot be squared with
Chapman.""' Based on this determination, the Court further stated:
In these circumstances, we need not decide what, if any,
deference is owed to the Commission in order to reject its
alleged contrary interpretation. Once we have determined a
statute's meaning, we adhere to our ruling under the doctrine of
stare decisis, and we assess an agency's later interpretation of
the statute against that settled law. 2
The importance of Neal as a clarification of the law is demonstrated
by the fact that the Court then went on to spell out the reasoning
behind its holding that stare decisis trumps any deference inquiry.
As a general matter, the Court noted that its "reluctance to
overturn precedents derives in part from institutional concerns
about the relationship of the Judiciary to Congress.""3 Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the unanimous Court then laid out the
specifics of the Court's rationale:
One reason that we give great weight to stare decisis in the area
of statutory construction is that "Congress is free to change this
Court's interpretation of its legislation." We have overruled our
precedents when the intervening development of the law has
"removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the
prior decision, or where the later law has rendered the decision
irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies." Absent
those changes or compelling evidence bearing on Congress'
original intent, our system demands that we adhere to our prior
interpretations of statutes."
As an interesting coda to a forceful opinion, Justice Kennedy noted
that "there may be little in logic to defend the statute's treatment
of LSD .... "s He then concluded, however, with the observation that
"Congress, not this Court, has the responsibility for revising its
statutes. Were we to alter our statutory interpretations from case
81. Id. at 294.
82. Id. at 295 (citing Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 536-37 and Maislin, 497 U.S. at 131).
83. Id.
84. Id. (citations omitted).
86. Id.
2002] 423
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
to case, Congress would have less reason to exercise its responsi-
bility to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair.""'
Although the thrust of these decisions is clearly the proposition
that stare decisis trumps the Chevron doctrine, it is important to
note that these cases can be distinguished from the main focus of
this Note in a number of significant ways. Prior, however, to
analyzing the relevant distinguishing features and presenting the
case against further application of this line of jurisprudence, the
background must be complete. To this end the following discussion
will document the Court's recent revival of Skidmore deference.
C. The Revival of Skidmore Deference
Prior to the passage of the APA in 1946, judge-made common law
controlled the field of administrative law. 7 In this context, the
Supreme Court, in 1944, decided Skidmore v. Swift & Co." The
question in Skidmore was "what, if any, deference courts should pay
to the Administrator's conclusions [regarding what types of work
constituted overtime within the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)]."9 In the end, Justice Jackson concluded:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of
the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
86. Id. at 296.
87. See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX L. REV.
113, 121 (1998) ("The common-law tradition in federal administrative law runs deep. For
litigants in the early administrative era (roughly, the first half of this century), the 'catchall'
remedy ... was an action in equity. At that time, federal equity law was judge-made.")
(footnotes omitted).
88. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
89. Id. at 139. The Administrator, whose conclusions the Court was reviewing, was
described as follows:
[Congress] did create the office of Administrator, impose upon him a variety of
duties, endow him with powers to inform himself of conditions in industries and
employments subject to the Act, and put on him the duties of bringing
injunction actions to restrain violations. Pursuit of his duties has accumulated
a considerable experience in the problems of ascertaining working time in
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may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control., °
In Skidmore, the Supreme Court thus mandated a case-by-case
review of agency action with the reviewing court's decision to give
deference hinging on how persuasively the agency argued and
supported its case.
The Supreme Court recently recognized a modern role for this
pre-APA doctrine in Christensen v. Harris County.91 The question
in Christensen was whether to give Chevron deference to a
Department of Labor (DOL) opinion letter stating that an employer
could not force employees to take compensatory vacation time in
order to avoid paying them compensation otherwise mandated by
the FLSA.92 Rejecting the DOL's arguments for unqualified Chevron
deference, the Court concluded: "Interpretations such as those in
opinion letters-like interpretations in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force
of law--do not warrant Chevron-style deference .... Instead,
interpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are
'entitled to respect' under our decision in Skidmore .... "a The Court
through Justice Thomas's opinion, thus arguably revived a middle
90. Id. at 140.
91. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
92. Id. at 586. The Court specifically stated:
In an attempt to avoid the conclusion that the FLSA does not prohibit
compelled use of compensatory time, petitioners and the United States contend
that we should defer to the Department of Labor's opinion letter.... Specifically,
they argue that the agency opinion letter is entitled to deference under our
decision in Chevron ....
Id.
93. Id. at 587 (citations omitted). This holding aligns the Court with at least one highly
respected commentator from the legal academy. In a 1990 article examining which types of
agency actions should bind courts and the public, Professor Robert Anthony argued that
agency action presented as interpretive rules and policies, or in manuals, guidelines, etc.,
should receive only Skidmore deference. See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency
Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 55-60 (1990).
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ground between deference under Chevron and no deference at all,
in which courts will review agency action for persuasiveness.
94
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia categorically rejected
the majority's explicit revival and application of Skidmore.95
Justice Scalia stated rather vehemently: "Skidmore deference to
authoritative agency views is an anachronism, dating from an
era in which we declined to give agency interpretations (including
interpretive regulations, as opposed to 'legislative rules') author-
itative effect.... That era came to an end with our watershed
decision in Chevron .... The depth of the division on the Court
over the issue was further confirmed by the fact that, in dissent,
Justice Breyer stated: "I do disagree with Justice Scalia's statement
that what he calls 'Skidmore deference' is 'an anachronism."'
97
Although the outcome of this deep division regarding the
foundational principles of Chevron remains unclear," what is clear
from Christensen is that the idea of Skidmore deference will
continue to have an impact on the Court's administrative law
jurisprudence.
This was proven just last term when the Court again referred to
Skidmore deference in its holding in United States v. Mead Corp.
99
In Mead, the Court considered whether to extend deference to tariff
classification rulings of the United States Customs Service that
94. This reading of the Court's opinion in Christensen has been the subject of significant
criticism. Compare Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the
Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1105-06 (2001) (arguing that "the
[Christensen] majority did not correctly apply Skidmore, and that the Court's decision invites
ad hocery by lower courts...") and Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron. A Defense of
Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 59
(2000) (arguing that [the division ofresponsibility for statutory interpretation that Chevron
formalized would be undermined if courts reviewed an agency's informal regulatory
interpretation under Skidmore') with Merrill & Hickman, supra note 66, at 852-63 (arguing
in favor of having both levels of deference).
95. Even apart from the narrow Skidmore issue, Professors Merrill and Hickman noted
that Christensen "reveals deep divisions among the Justices about the basic principles that
govern the scope of the Chevron doctrine." Merrill & Hickman, supra note 66, at 835.
96. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
97. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer continued: "Chevron made no
relevant change. It simply focused upon an additional, separate legal reason for deferring to
certain agency determinations, namely that Congress has delegated to the agency the legal
authority to make those determinations." Id.
98. See Duffy, supra note 87, at 189-212 (examining the conflicting views of Chevron).
99. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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were communicated solely in "ruling letters" issued to importers of
goods."° Writing for the eight-Justice majority, Justice Souter
ultimately concluded that "classification rulings are best treated
like 'interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines.' ... They are beyond the
Chevron pale."'O For the Court, however, this conclusion was not
the end of the deference inquiry. Justice Souter's opinion continued:
To agree ... that Customs ruling letters do not fall within
Chevron is not, however, to place them outside the pale of any
deference whatever. Chevron did nothing to eliminate
Skidmore's holding that an agency's interpretation may merit
some deference whatever its form, given the "specialized
experience and broader investigations and information"
available to the agency, ... and given the value of uniformity in
its administrative and judicial understandings of what a
national law requires."2
Although Justice Souter asserted for the majority that "we hold
nothing more than we said last Term in response to the particular
statutory circumstances in Christensen,"'3 Mead included much
more discussion of the basic questions the Christensen Court did
not address. Particularly, Mead confirmed that Skidmore deference
is in fact a separate level of deference and that it represents a cal-
culated, albeit venerable, response by the Court to the complexities
of the modem administrative state."0 " The majority in Mead,
100. Id. at 222.
101. Id. at 234 (citation omitted) (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587). In so holding, the
Court to some extent attempted to settle the controversy over the basic foundations of
Chevron discussed in note 95. As Justice Souter's majority opinion stated: 'We hold that
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority." Id. at 226-27.
As Justice Scalia was the sole dissenter in Mead it seems likely that this formulation of
Chevron's applicability will continue to control in future cases.
102. Id. at 234 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 237-38.
104. See id. at 235-37. As the Court specifically stated:
Underlying the position we take here ... is a choice about the best way to deal
with an inescapable feature of the body of congressional legislation authorizing
administrative action. That feature is the great variety of ways in which the
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however, in no way addressed the stare decisis implications of
Skidmore deference, most likely because any such discussion would
be solely obiter dicta based on the procedural posture of the Mead
case-the Customs Service action at issue implicated no prior
controlling precedent.
In a characteristically forceful dissent, Justice Scalia rejected the
majority's position completely. Further, he asserted that the
majority's opinion "makes an avulsive change in judicial review of
federal administrative action" and predicted "wle will be sorting
out the consequences of the Mead doctrine, which has today
replaced the Chevron doctrine, for years to come."10 5 Aside from
these general observations, Justice Scalia predicted three negative
effects of the majority's decision, "protracted confusion," 06 "an
artificially induced increase in informal rulemaking,"107 and "the
ossification of large portions of our statutory law." 08
The primary practical effect of Mead, in Justice Scalia's opinion,
will be a significant reduction in agencies' power to predict when
they will receive deference in exercising their ability to promulgate
regulations interpreting the statutes they are charged to admin-
ister.' 9 As the basis for this conclusion, Justice Scalia asserted:
"The Court has largely replaced Chevron ... with that test most
beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by
litigants who want to know what to expect): thol 'totality of the
circumstances' test."'10
laws invest the Government's administrative arms with discretion, and with
procedures for exercising it, in giving meaning to Acts of Congress ....
Although we all accept the position that the Judiciary should defer to at least
some of this multifarious administrative action, we have to decide how to take
account of the great range of its variety.... The Court's choice has been to tailor
deference to variety. This acceptance of the range of statutory variation has led
the Court to recognize more than one variety ofjudicial deference ....
Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
106. Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What was previously a general presumption of
authority in agencies to resolve ambiguity in the statutes ... has been changed to a
presumption of no such authority, which must be overcome by affirmative legislative intent
to the contrary.").
110. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Second, Justice Scalia asserted that the Mead decision will
prompt more informal rulemaking. This concern is based on Justice
Scalia's estimation that "[algencies will now have high incentive
to rush out barebones, ambiguous rules construing statutory
ambiguities .... ""1 Justice Scalia's consideration of the effect that
future grants of Skidmore deference would have on administrative
and statutory law is most interesting."2 It is to this portion of
Justice Scalia's dissent, and more specifically, his concerns about
ossification of administrative law and judicial abdication, that this
Note now turns.
III. JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: TWO POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS TO THE TENSION BETWEEN STARE DECISIS AND GRANTS
OF SKIDMORE DEFERENCE
A. Justice Scalia: Stare Decisis Controls
In Part B of his dissent in Mead, Justice Scalia considered at
length the practical effects of the Court's decision. Most signifi-
cantly for the purposes of this Note, Justice Scalia discussed the
possibility of ossification of various regulatory regimes through the
application of Skidmore deference and its interaction with stare
decisis. Justice Scalia stated the problem as follows:
For the indeterminately large number of statutes taken out of
Chevron by today's decision ... ambiguity (and hence flexibility)
will cease with the first judicial resolution. Skidmore deference
gives the agency's current position some vague and uncertain
amount of respect, but it does not, like Chevron, leave the matter
within the control of the Executive Branch for the future. Once
the court has spoken, it becomes unlawful for the agency to take
a contradictory position; the statute now says what the court has
prescribed.1 s
111. Id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia's
measure of the usefulness and desirability of informal rulemaking is directly in contrast with
the position of his former colleagues on the D.C. Circuit, who heavily favor the use of
informal rulemaking. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
112. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 247-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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In support of this proposition, Justice Scalia simply cited to Neal,
Lechmere, and Maislin without further explanation." 4 Without even
mentioning the term, Justice Scalia thus asserted that the stare
decisis effect of a court's grant of Skidmore deference will create a
judicial construction of a statute due, in future cases, the "strong
presumption" of correctness the court employs generally when
confronted with statutory construction precedents. 5
The most important part of this discussion, however, is the
hypothetical Justice Scalia penned to explore agencies' possible
procedural responses to avoid the ossification of administrative law
that he feared Mead would promote. He wrote: "One might respond
that such ossification would not result if the agency were simply
to readopt its interpretation, after a court reviewing it under
Skidmore had rejected it, by repromulgating it through one of the
Chevron-eligible procedural formats approved by the Court
today.""6 In rejecting this option, Justice Scalia stated:
Approving this procedure would be a landmark abdication of
judicial power. It is worlds apart from Chevron proper ....
[Uinder this view, the reviewing court will not be holding the
agency's authoritative interpretation within the scope of the
ambiguity; but will be holding that the agency has not used the
'delegation-conferring' procedures, and that the court must
therefore interpret the statute on its own-but subject to reversal
if and when the agency uses the proper procedures.
I know of no case, in the entire history of the federal courts,
in which we have allowed a judicial interpretation of a statute
to be set aside by an agency--or have allowed a lower court to
render an interpretation of a statute subject to correction by an
agency.11 7
Justice Scalia thus set out, in no uncertain terms, a stinging
indictment of the possible effects of the interaction of stare decisis
and Skidmore deference. Others in the federal judiciary have been
114. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
116. Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 247-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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much more receptive to the idea of deferring to agency inter-
pretations that conflict with judicial precedents.
B. The Eleventh Circuit: Limited Agency "Overruling"
In 1994, seven years before Justice Scalia wrote his Mead
hypothetical, the Eleventh Circuit approved the exact procedure so
roundly criticized by Justice Scalia. In Satellite Broadcasting and
Communications Ass'n v. Oman,118 a three judge panel of the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether United States Copyright
Office regulations interpreting § 111 of the Copyright Act119 were
valid though they conflicted with prior Circuit precedent. The court
concluded:
Although the new regulations conflict with our interpretation
of the term "cable system" in SBN, they are neither arbitrary,
capricious, nor in conflict with the clear meaning of the statute.
They are therefore valid exercises of the Copyright Office's
statutory authority to interpret the provisions of the compulsory
licensing scheme, and are binding on this circuit.1"°
On its face, this holding directly contradicts Justice Scalia's
assertion that no court has held that its earlier decision was open
to modification by administrative action. It is important to closely
examine the procedural posture that led the Eleventh Circuit to this
holding in order to determine whether the court's decision can be
factually distinguished from the situations that troubled Justice
Scalia.
In 1991, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the meaning of§ 111 in
the context of a copyright infringement action by NBC against a
satellite carrier in NBC v. Satellite Broadcasting Networks
(NBC). 121 The court interpreted the statutory definition of "cable
system" under § 111(f) to include satellite carriers, which were
thus covered by the compulsory licensing scheme put in place by
118. 17 F.3d 344 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 581 U.S. 823 (1994).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
120. Satelite Broadcasting, 17 F.3d at 345.
121. 940 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1991).
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Congress. 22 On this question, the Copyright office had issued a
policy statement stating that satellite carriers do not fall within the
statutory definition of "cable systems" under § 111(f).' s In the NBC
opinion, the court specifically rejected the Copyright Office's
rationale, stating, "we have considered the views of the Copyright
Office on the language and legislative history of§ 111, but we find
those views unpersuasive. "124 After NBC, the Copyright Office
reasserted the position it had taken in the policy decision, this time
by promulgating a legislative rule through proper notice and
comment procedures.'25 Reviewing the meaning of "cable system"
again in Satellite Broadcasting, the court was thus faced with the
question of whether to grant Chevron deference to an agency
interpretation it had earlier declined to follow simply because this
time around the agency had used a Chevron-eligible format.
The issue raised in Justice Scalia's Mead dissent thus squarely
faced the Eleventh Circuit. In response, the court conducted a
careful analysis of the existing law on the subject. The court first
analyzed the Copyright Office's authority and then examined
whether Chevron or Lechmere was the Supreme Court precedent
more directly on point."2 The court distinguished the situation in
Lechmere from the problem in Satellite Broadcasting because the
former dealt with a statutory scheme that was explicit on the
definition of the term at issue. In contrast, in NBC the Eleventh
Circuit had rested its decision "not upon the statute's 'clear
meaning,' but rather upon inferences drawn from the statutory
122. Id. at 1470.
123. See Cable Compulsory License: Deftnition ofCable Systems, 56 Fed. Reg. 31,580 (July
11, 1991). It is important to recognize that this policy decision was an agency action not due
Chevron deference because it was merely a statement of policy accompanying a notice of
proposed rulemaking that indicated the Copyright Office's intent to issue a future legislative
rule interpreting the term "cable system." As such, the policy decision is agency action of the
type that the Court in Christensen and Mead held should be analyzed for deference under
Skidmore.
124. NBC, 940 F.2d at 1470 n.4. While the Eleventh Circuit did not specify here that it
was using a Skidmore analysis, the use of the term "persuasive" points strongly to reliance
on an analysis based on the traditional standards identified by Justice Jackson in Skidmore.
Id.
125. See 57 Fed. Reg. 3,284 (Jan. 29, 1992) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.17(k)). The
Eleventh Circuit also noted that "[tihe Copyright Office is a federal agency with authority
to promulgate rules concerning the meaning and application of§ 111." Satellite Broadcasting,
17 F.3d at 347.
126. See Satellite Broadcasting, 17 F.3d at 347-48.
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scheme and upon our policy determination .... " The court granted
Chevron deference to the Copyright Office rule for two other
reasons. First, "a] contrary result would illogically wed [this]
circuit to the SBN decision, while all other circuits and the
Supreme Court would be bound under Chevron to defer to the
Copyright Office rule.""2 Second, such a limited deference policy as
Lechmere dictates would have "create[d] a rush to the courthouse
among parties wishing to litigate a statute's meaning before an
agency has exercised its broad 'knowledge respecting the matters
subjected to agency regulations.'"'29 The Eleventh Circuit thus
refused to use stare decisis as a figleaf to usurp the congressionally
delegated authority of the Copyright Office to interpret the statute
it administers. By rejecting the heavy reliance on stare decisis of
the strictly limited deference doctrine expressed in Lechmere, the
Eleventh Circuit fulfilled its proper judicial role in the modern
administrative state.
In Satellite Broadcasting, the Eleventh Circuit thus approved the
exact procedure dismissed by Justice Scalia in his Mead dissent
minus an explicit reference to Skidmore. The Supreme Court's
specific resurrection of the doctrine in Christensen and Mead had
yet to happen, but Skidmore remained viable law in 1994 when the
Eleventh Circuit decided Satellite Broadcasting because, despite
benign neglect by the Supreme Court, the case had never been
significantly undercut or specifically overruled.
IV. ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT
The foregoing discussion set forth the legal landscape now
confronting the courts, individuals, and agencies who participate in
the creation and application of administrative law. This discussion
illustrated the considerable tension and uncertainty regarding the
interaction of stare decisis and deference to administrative
agencies, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's recent
revitalization of Skidmore deference. Using the Court's juris-
prudence regarding the interaction of stare decisis and the well-
127. Id. at 348.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citation omitted).
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established Chevron doctrine as a guide, this section analyzes the
unresolved question of how stare decisis and Skidmore deference
should interact.
Specifically, this section considers possible agency reactions to
judicial decisions to withhold Skidmore deference, in particular the
substantive propriety of agency attempts to "overrule" such judicial
decisions. Two possible circumstances exist in which such a
situation could arise. First, a court could strike down the agency's
rule as "unpersuasive" under Skidmore and the agency could then
promulgate the rule through a Chevron-eligible format." 0 Second,
applying Skidmore's deference framework, a court could uphold the
agency's original action and subsequently the agency could attempt
to promulgate a rule contrary to its interpretation previously given
deference under Skidmore. In either case, the agency might be
confronted with a reviewing court asserting that its prior decision
applying Skidmore also was a statutory construction deserving the
full presumption of correctness and stare decisis effect applicable
to such decisions.131
A reviewing court that chose to eschew the Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning in Satellite Broadcasting and strike down the new agency
interpretation would likely rely on the Supreme Court's decisions
stating that stare decisis trumps Chevron deference, and the
concern with ossification Justice Scalia addressed in his Mead
dissent.'32 Many courts and commentators would also likely rely
on classic understandings of the role of the federal courts,
memorably put forth in Marbury v. Madison,"' which held that the
Constitution vests the courts with the power to interpret the laws.
The following section examines each of these arguments and
analyzes them in light of the values furthered by both stare decisis
and Chevron.
130. It is important to note here that the agency is "promulgating" the rule for the first
time through the Chevron-eligible procedures. In some cases, the rule will never have been
"promulgated" at all, merely announced or published. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 223
(examining a Customs Service "ruling letter" that was never"promulgated" but was merely
sent to the affected party).
131. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of this presumption.
132. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
133. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The Supreme Court's oft-quotedMarbury holding is: "It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id.
at 177.
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A. Stare Decisis and Skidmore
The Supreme Court's stare decisis precedents, Maislin, Lechmere,
and Neal, can be significantly distinguished as addressing a
discrete and well-defined subset of cases. Specifically, these cases
dealt with conflicts between pre-Chevron judicial statutory
interpretations and post-Chevron interpretations of the same
statutory provisions by administrative agencies."" They are
therefore not on point to determine the interaction between stare
decisis and Skidmore in cases such as Satellite Broadcasting where
judicially settled statutory construction is not at issue. These cases
do not undercut the limited ability of administrative agencies to
overrule attempts by the courts to create a statutory construction
in the course of analyzing agency action with Skidmore deference.
Maislin, Lechmere, and Neal do not undercut the limited ability of
administrative agencies to "overrule" judicial decisions creating
statutory meaning in the absence of controlling judicial precedent
or Chevron-eligible administrative action.
As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Satellite Broadcasting, the
precedential effect of a ruling is minimal when the ruling court did
not attempt to address the "clear meaning" of a statute or statutory
scheme." 5 In cases where a reviewing court is analyzing agency
action under Skidmore, the court should evaluate the persua-
siveness of the agency action and apply its decision to the facts of
the case. The court should, however, resist the temptation to
infringe on the expressed intent of the agency to give binding
content to the statutory provision at issue. This conception of
Skidmore is supported by the Mead Court's explanation that
Skidmore represents a distinct level of deference that is a
response to "the great variety of ways in which the laws invest
the Government's administrative arms with discretion, and
with procedures for exercising it, in giving meaning to Acts of
134. See Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 531-39 (discussing conflict); Neal, 516 U.S. at 289-96
(same); Maislin, 497 U.S. at 126-33 (same).
135. See supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text (analyzing the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion in Satellite Broadcasting).
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Congress."1 16 This, in turn, reflects a very conscious choice by the
Court "to tailor deference to variety.
137
Any judicial statutory interpretation that takes place in such a
context should serve only as persuasive dicta for a future court
pending further administrative action interpreting the statute.
Procedurally, a court initially confronted with such a case should
only review the agency action for persuasiveness and defer to, or
strike down the agency action. In striking down the agency action,
the court may be noting its disapproval of the procedure the agency
used, s or may be expressing its disagreement with the agency's
proffered support for its decision. In either case, by refusing to defer
to the agency under Skidmore, the court should merely be seen as
flagging the problematic facets of the agency action for further
agency review. As such, the only precedential value of the court's
decision should be as a guidepost to the agency for tailoring its
procedural and substantive choices in formulating policy." 9 After a
reviewing court makes a decision to uphold or strike down an
agency action under Skidmore, the agency should remain free to
revisit the issue and, in effect, overrule the court's decision by
creating a binding, procedurally sound legislative rule imple-
menting the agency's choice. The interaction of courts and agencies
in this manner would have the added benefits of creating more
reliance on the expertise of administrative agencies and increasing
public participation in the administrative process.
136. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236.
137. Id.
138. This is permissible under Vermont Yankee as long as the reviewing court confines
itself to evaluating whether the agency has followed the basic requirements of the APA. See
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519,548 (1978)
(noting that "nothing ... permitted the court to review and overturn the rulemaking
proceeding ... so long as the Commission employed at least the statutory minima ...").
139. It is important to note here that this approach assists the agency in making the
procedural decisions that are firmly within its discretion under Chenery 11. See SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). This situation differs somewhat from the Chenery H
situation, however, in that under Skidmore the review inquiry is not only into procedure but
also the substance and support for the agency action. Chenery HI and Skidmore are
nonetheless closely related in terms of the philosophy of administrative expertise that
animates their deferential treatment of agency decision making. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of
Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 735, 739-43 (2002) (discussing the expertise rationale in
Skidmore and Chenery 11).
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B. Analyzing the Force of the Ossification Argument
In either case sketched above giving rise to the interaction of
stare decisis and Skidmore deference, Justice Scalia's ossification
argument only becomes a problem if the reviewing court
overestimates its proper role and attempts to craft a controlling
interpretation of the statute. It would be judicial overreaching of
the worst kind for a court to assert that it was putting a controlling
interpretation on a statute in either case, but particularly after
rejecting Skidmore deference. This is because by interpreting or
applying the statute it administers, the agency has manifested its
clear intent to fulfill the role that Congress assigned to the agency.
For a court to reject the agency's application or interpretation as
"unpersuasive" and to then create a judicial construction on second
review of the same policy that can only be overruled by legislative
action would usurp the role of the administrative agency. By failing
to remand the action to the agency in such situations, the court
would effectively remove the agency's interpretive function and
leave it solely with the task of implementing the statute as
interpreted by the court. Similarly, holding, on second review, that
a prior instance of the court deferring to agency action under
Skidmore was controlling or binding precedent would significantly
undercut the flexibility sheltered by Chevron and identified by
commentators as a virtue of the modern administrative state.14
C. Countering the Marbury Argument
Finally, the Marbury argument regarding the peculiar and
exclusive duty of the federal courts to expound the laws of the
United States is of limited critical impact in this inquiry. Although
it is the duty of the courts to "say what the law is," 41 it is
undoubtedly the duty of Congress to make the laws to be inter-
preted. In its administrative law jurisprudence, the Court has
recognized that the modern administrative state is a result of
Congress' realization that it cannot possibly create laws that are
140. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the values and virtues of the
Chevron decision).
141. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
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particularized enough to be independently effective. Congress thus
mandates that administrative agencies fill gaps in the statutory
schemes, the administration of which Congress delegated to the
agencies. 4 2 Thus, as Professor Henry Monaghan forcefully argued
in 1983 on the cusp of the Chevron revolution, although Marbury is
important as an administrative law case, it fails to preclude judicial
deference to agency action.4 Indeed, Professor Monaghan spe-
cifically noted that "there has never been a pervasive notion that
limited government mandated an all-encompassing judicial duty to
supply all of the relevant meaning of statutes. Rather the judicial
duty is to ensure that the administrative agency stays within the
zone of discretion committed to it by its organic act." 14 Within this
framework, the judiciary fulfills its duty to shape the law when it
interprets the outer boundaries of the zones of discretion set by
Congress for each administrative agency.
This conception of the modern administrative state led first to the
Court's creation of the Chevron framework which Professor Cass
Sunstein has memorably described as the "counter-Marbury[] for
the administrative state."145 Building on this framework, the
current Court has recognized the need for another level of deference
to preserve the flexibility and responsiveness of the modern
administrative state.'" The revival of Skidmore deference thus may
be viewed as a part of the continuing reappraisal by the Supreme
142. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-31 (discussing congressional delegation of gap-filling
authority to agencies).
143. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 6(1983).
144. Id. at 33.
145. See Sunstein, supra note 65 (stating in full that "Chevron promises to be a pillar in
administrative law for many years to come. It has become a kind of Marbury, or counter-
Marbury, for the administrative state.").
146. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 235-39 (discussing the Court's conception ofdeference as a non-
binary inquiry). Skidmore deference is especially important in light of the continuing
delineation ofthe contours of the Chevron doctrine in cases like Mead. Although some critics,
notably Justice Scalia and Professor Krotoszynski, maintain that the Mead implied
delegation test is too broad and easily manipulated, even a mildly principled application of
the test based on traditional principles of statutory construction would seem to mark the
outer limit of Chevron deference. See id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court has largely
replaced Chevron ... with that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules ...:
th'ol' 'totality of the circumstances' test."); Krotoszynski, supra note 139, at 751 ("The
implied delegation prong of the Mead test represents a naked power grab by the federal
courts.").
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Court of the traditional role of the federal courts in light of the
complexity of modem government and the expertise of admin-
istrative agencies. Allowing administrative agencies a limited
opportunity to "overrule" a court's Skidmore reading would work no
cataclysmic upset of the American system of government that was
not already worked by the Chevron court in 1984.147
CONCLUSION
The tension between the doctrines of stare decisis and judicial
deference to administrative agency actions, particularly at the
Skidmore deference level, need not be a Zero sum game. Instead,
courts should pay close attention to the facts of each individual
case as signals that indicate what level of deference is needed and
how to best serve the values of stare decisis and administrative
flexibility. In cases where there is a strong factual basis for
applying stare decisis, such as an existing Supreme Court opinion
or circuit precedent that interprets the plain meaning of the statute
in question, stare decisis should apply and the inconsistent agency
interpretation should be struck down. In cases, however, where
there is no strong need to follow precedent based on the facts, to do
so would make stare decisis an end in itself rather than a tool used
to further the values of our legal system. This would be a great
impediment to the flexibility of the modem administrative state
and a misapplication of the venerable doctrine of stare decisis.
Paul A. Dame
147. At least one commentator has stated that some of the courts of appeals are reaching
the same result by overruling their own precedents. See Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the
Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 791 n.86 (2002) (citing Aguirre v.
INS, 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996) and Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 911 F.2d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
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